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BRIEF NOTE
Quorum Requirements for Shareholders'
Meetings Under Florida Statutes Section
607.094
In 1975 the Florida Legislature enacted the General Corporation Act,' chapter 607 of the Florida Statutes.' The legislature patterned the new corporation statutes after the Model Business Corporation Act ("M.B.C.A."), which the American Bar Association
first presented in 1950.' The M.B.C.A. had formed the basis for
portions of the prior Florida corporation statutes." Thus, the passage of chapter 607 was expected to make few substantive changes
in Florida law.' Section 607.094 was a notable exception, with possibly unforeseen consequences.
Both the M.B.C.A. and chapter 607 contain provisions that
govern quorum requirements at shareholders' meetings. The first
two subsections of section 607.094 of the Florida Statutes are identical to section 32 of the M.B.C.A. e Subsection (1) establishes the
minimum number of shareholders necessary to constitute a quorum.7 If a quorum is present, then subsection (2) provides that the
affirmative vote of a majority of the shareholders "represented at
the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter" will be
1. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-250.
2. FLA. STAT. ch. 607 (1981).
3. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 2D ix (Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as M.B.C.A.
ANN. 2D1].
4. Chambers & Cochran, Florida's Corporation Law-Problems and Proposed Revisions, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 58, 60 (1974).
5. Edwards, Twelfth Survey of Florida Law: CorporateLaw
and Securities Regulation,
30 U. MIAmi L. Rzv. 401, 402 (1976).
6. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.094(1)-(2) (1981) with MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.
2D § 32 (1971).
7. FLA. STAT. § 607.094(1) (1981) provides:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a majority of the
shares entitled to vote, represented in person or by proxy, shall constitute a quorum at a meeting of shareholders, but in no event shall a quorum consist of less
than one-third of the shares entitled to vote at the meeting. When a specified
item of business is required to be voted on by a class or series of stock, a majority of the shares of such class or series shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of such item of business by that class or series.
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considered as "the act of the shareholders." In contrast, section
607.094(3), dealing with shareholder withdrawals from annual
meetings, has no analogous provision in the M.B.C.A. Subsection
(3) provides:
607.094 Shareholder quorum and voting.(3) After a quorum has been established at a shareholders'
meeting, the subsequent withdrawal of shareholders, so as to re-

duce the number of shares entitled to vote at the meeting below
the number required for a quorum, shall not affect the validity
of any action taken at the meeting or any adjournment thereof.'
As presently drafted, the statute is ambiguous. It fails to define
"withdrawal" or distinguish among the various circumstances
under which shareholders leave a meeting. Moreover, subsection
(3) does not specify the number of votes necessary to carry a motion after shareholders have withdrawn. The statute seemingly
would tolerate a situation in which a handful of shareholders could
continue to transact business, although they constitute only a
small fraction of the original quorum.
According to one authority, statutory provisions such as section 607.094(3), which preserve a quorum after shareholder withdrawals, embody "the modern and better view." 10 Florida is one of
five states that have codified the withdrawal rule. The other four
states are Arizona," California,"1 Oregon," and Pennsylvania.14
The American Bar Foundation-American Bar Association ("ABFABA") commentators interpret these statutes as
provid[ing] that shareholders present at a duly called or held
meeting at which a quorum is present may continue to transact
business until adjournment notwithstanding the withdrawal of
enough shareholders to leave less than a quorum if a majority of
§ 607.094(2) (1981) provides:
If a quorum is present, the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares represented at the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter shall be the act
of the shareholders, unless the vote of a greater number or voting by classes is
required by this chapter or the articles of incorporation or bylaws.
9. Id. § 607.094(3).
8.

FLA. STAT.

10. 5

W.

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§

2013.1 (rev.

perm. ed. 1976).
11. ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-032 (1977).
12. CAL. CORP. CODE § 602(b) (West Supp. 1981).
13. OR. REV. STAT. § 57.165 (1979). For a discussion of the statute's legislative history,

see Jones v. Wallace, 291 Or. 11, 628 P.2d 388 (1981).
14. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1503(A)(2) (Purdon 1967).
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the shares required to constitute a quorum approves any action
taken."'
This analysis of the statutory withdrawal provisions is reasonable,
but the commentators offer no authority or reasoning in support of
their interpretation. A body of case law that addresses some of the
issues raised by the statutes does tend to comport with the ABFABA's analysis, but it is by no means conclusive.
The Florida corporation statute lacks a provision that requires
the adjournment of a shareholders' meeting following the loss of a
quorum. Although Robert's Rules of Order and parliamentary law
are not the legally binding procedure governing shareholders'
meetings,1 most courts agree that the only possible legal action is
to adjourn once a quorum no longer exists.1 7 The withdrawal rule,
then, in both its common-law and codified forms, is an exception
to the general requirement that a quorum be present at all times
while shareholders transact business at their annual meeting.
Significantly, the cases and statutes deal with shareholder
withdrawals from meetings, not mere "departures." The. courts
that have dealt with the problem of shareholder withdrawals were
considering situations in which shareholders had left a meeting
with the intention of breaking the quorum, not situations in which
they departed because of boredom, other commitments, and the
like. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth ex
rel. Sheip v. Vandergrift 8 was one of the first courts to formulate
the withdrawal rule.
In Vandergrift the shareholders of the Philadelphia Veneer &
Lumber Company convened their annual meeting with 1,887 of
2,081 shares represented. The corporation's bylaws provided that a
majority of the shares issued and represented constituted a quorum. 19 A number of shareholders who were present objected to the
election of the chairman of the shareholders' meeting. When advised that the election was final, the objectors withdrew. 0 As a result, of the original 1,887 shares represented at the opening of the
meeting, only 992 remained to transact business." The objectors
15. M.B.C.A. ANN. 2D, supra note 3, § 32, 2d sentence, 3.02.
16. Abbey Properties Co. v. Presidential Ins. Co., 119 So. 2d 74, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960).
17. See, e.g., Hexter v. Columbia Baking Co., 16 Del. Ch. 263, 267, 145 A. 115, 116
(1929).
18. 232 Pa. 53, 81 A. 153 (1911).
19. Id. at 58, 81 A. at 153. The bylaws in Vandergrift closely parallel the quorum requirement in FLA. STAT. § 607.094(1) (1981). See supra note 7.
20. 232 Pa. at 60, 81 A. at 154.
21. Id. at 60-61, 81 A. at 154.
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subsequently commenced a quo warranto proceeding to challenge
the actions taken at the shareholders' meeting following their
withdrawal.
The Pennsylvania court stated that "[sltockholders who attend a meeting, and then without cause voluntarily withdraw, are
in no better position than those who voluntarily absent themselves
in the first instance. 22 The court then proceeded to hold:
In our opinion the sounder and safer rule, as above indicated, is
that even a majority cannot capriciously withdraw after the
meeting is legally organized for the very purpose of breaking a

quorum, and then ask the courts for relief on the ground that a
quorum was not present when the act complained of was done.
Where there is a legally constituted meeting, the acts of a majority of those present are the acts of the corporation, though such
majority is less than a majority of the total number of stock2
holders or shares. 3

In other words, shareholder withdrawals for the purpose of breaking a quorum will be unavailing.
Apart from the equitable considerations, the Vandergrift
court based its holding on the corporation's statutory duty to conduct annual meetings, which the court would not allow the tactics
of shareholder factions to defeat. 24 Delaware bases its withdrawal
rule on similar policy considerations: "[R]easonable rules should
prevail in aid of the accomplishment of the statutory purpose that
meetings be held for the election of directors at the time fixed by
the by-laws."' 8 In Delaware, "a shareholder or proxy holder, once
having attended a meeting, should be deemed present for quorum
purposes . .

.,.

Not all courts, however, have viewed the withdrawal rule this
favorably. Virginia has criticized and rejected the rule.' 7 A federal
court in Massachusetts has limited the rule by holding that shareholders can withdraw their proxies before the resumption of an ad22. Id. at 61, 81 A. at 155-56 (emphasis added).
23. d. at 63, 81 A. at 156 (citation omitted). The court's observation about the majority
needed to carry a motion comports with FLA. STAT. § 607.094(2) (1981). See supra note 8.
24. 232 Pa. at 62, 81 A. at 156; accord Perry v. Bank of Commerce, 116 Miss. 838, 77
So. 812 (1918); Lutz v. Webster, 249 Pa. 226, 94 A. 834 (1915).
25. Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 26 Del. Ch. 1, 15, 20 A.2d 743, 749
(1941); see Duffy v. Loft, Inc., 17 Del. Ch. 140, 151 A. 223 (Ch.), aff'd, 17 Del. Ch. 376, 152
A. 849 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Hexter v. Columbia Baking Co., 16 Del. Ch. 263, 145 A. 115 (1929).
26. Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 26 Del. Ch. at 15, 20 A.2d at 749-50.
27. Levisa Oil Corp. v. Quigley, 217 Va. 898, 903-04, 234 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1977) (unsophisticated majority shareholders withdrew in face of directors' parliamentary maneuvers).
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journed meeting.2 Nevertheless, the rule does deter dissidents
from intentionally disrupting lawfully held and orderly meetings
"because of whim, caprice or chagrin."' This formulation of the
rule, however, creates the difficult problem of establishing whether
the shareholders' motivation for leaving the meeting was to "withdraw" for the purpose of breaking the quorum, or merely to "depart."30 Thus, once enough shareholders have left a meeting so
that a quorum is no longer present, the remaining shareholders
must ascertain whether those who left withdrew or merely departed. Only if it is clear that the shareholders "withdrew" can
subsequent actions at the meeting withstand a later challenge in
court.31
The purpose of the withdrawal rule codified in section
607.094(3) is to preserve quorums and enable the remaining shareholders to continue to conduct business. But subsection (2) fails to
specify whether the majority needed to transact business is that of
the original quorum, the legal minimum quorum, or the remaining
shares represented after a withdrawal. Only one court has confronted the ambiguous voting requirements of section 607.094, but
it opted to evade the issue entirely. 2 That court did, however, note
that "[s]ection 607.094(2) of the Florida Corporation Act appears
to require that a director receive the affirmative vote of a majority
of the shares represented at a meeting and entitled to vote
"55

28. Textron, Inc. v. American Woolen Co., 122 F. Supp. 305, 311 (D. Mass. 1954). Noting the decisions in Hexter v. Columbia Baking Co., 16 Del. Ch. 263, 145 A. 115 (1929), and
Commonwealth ex rel. Sheip v. Vandergrift, 232 Pa. 53, 81 A. 153 (1911), the court
observed:
I have grave doubts as to the soundness of those decisions. Those courts themselves admit that under ordinary parliamentary law a quorum must remain present throughout. They proceed on the basis that stockholders' meetings are required, and that accordingly more lenient principles should apply. This seems a
questionable doctrine, and one difficult of delineation. It would seem preferable
to lower the quota requirement itself than to propose artificial means of circumventing it.
Id. at 311; see also Leamy v. Sinaloa Exploration & Dev. Co., 15 Del. Ch. 28, 130 A.2d 282
(1925) (shareholder with proxies, present solely to protest legality of meeting from which he
was removed, was not present for quorum purposes).
29. Hexter v. Columbia Baking Co., 16 Del. Ch. 263, 268, 145 A. 115, 117 (1929).
30. 69 HARv. L. REV. 920, 922 (1955).
31. Because adjourned meetings are effectively part of the original meeting, withdrawn
shares are counted for quorum purposes at the subsequent sessions. FLA. STAT. §§
607.084(5), .094(3) (1981); see Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 26 Del. Ch. 1,
15, 20 A.2d 743, 749 (1941).
32. Malhas v. Shinn, 597 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979).
33. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
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Former section 608.08(1) of the Florida Statutes required that
directors be chosen at an annual meeting "by a plurality of the
votes cast at such election.""4 This provision was consistent with
the Delaware decisions: "Outstanding among the democratic
processes concerning corporate elections is the general rule that a
majority of the votes cast at a stockholders' meeting, providing a
quorum is present, is sufficient to elect Directors."'"
The drafters of section 32 of the M.B.C.A. had intended only
to adopt the position of the court in Vandergrift that "the majority in question" is not to be "a majority of the voting shares outstanding."' The seemingly deliberate omission of the votes cast
requirement in the M.B.C.A. as adopted in Florida and other jurisdictions has the effect of voiding any action of a shareholders'
meeting not approved by a majority of the shares "represented in7
person or by proxy" and constituting a legal minimum quorum.
An emphasis on the actual votes cast would have avoided these
ambiguities because voting was not linked to the quorum. Under
Florida's present law, however, the one-third absolute minimum
requirement to constitute a quorum contained in section
607.094(1) would permit an affirmative vote of one-sixth plus one
of the shares "entitled to vote" to validate actions taken at a
shareholders' meeting.88 The following example illustrates this
result.
For purposes of analysis, assume that ABC Corporation has
one hundred shares outstanding and entitled to vote at a shareholders' meeting and that all one hundred shares attend either in
person or by proxy. If only fifty-one ballots are cast 9 on a particular issue, with twenty-six in favor, the election will be invalid if the
34. FLA. STAT. § 608.08(1) (1975) (emphasis added); see Gentry-Futch Co. v. Gentry, 90
Fla. 595, 106 So. 473 (1925); Berkowitz v. Firestone, 192 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).

35. Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Investment Assocs., 29 Del. Ch. 593, 600, 51 A.2d
572, 576 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (emphasis added); accord Hinckley v. Swaner, 13 Utah 2d 93, 94,
368 P.2d 709, 710 (1962); Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, 273 Wis. 159, 167, 77 N.W.2d 389,
393 (1956); see also W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 2020, at 102 ("By the weight of authority, a majority of the votes actually cast will decide," even if this majority is less than a
majority of those represented.).
36. M.B.C.A. ANN. 2D, supra note 3, § 32, 2d sentence, 2.
37. State ex rel. Theard v. Briede, 52 So. 2d 568, 570 (La. Ct. App. 1951) (construction
of charter amendment).
38. FLA. STAT. § 607.094(1) (1981) read in pari materia with FLA. STAT. § 607.094(2)
(1981) provides this result. See supra notes 7-8.
39. "[A] majority of the shares entitled to vote, representedin person or by proxy, shall
constitute a quorum at a meeting of shareholders .... " FLA. STAT. § 607.094(1) (1981)
(emphasis added). Because 51 shares is a majority of all the shares entitled to vote, and the
51 shares are represented at the meeting, the minimum quorum requirement is satisfied.
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other forty-nine shares remain represented but merely refrain
from voting. 0 Section 607.094(2) compels this result. This section
requires the affirmative vote of the majority of the shares "represented" to constitute an act of the shareholders. Under the preceding facts, the abstaining "represented" shares are included in the
figure used to determine a majority under section 607.094(2); thus,
the vote cannot be valid unless the fifty-one voted shares are
unanimous.4
If the quorum requirement is fifty-one, however, the departure
of the forty-nine voting shares, rather than their mere abstention,
would allow twenty-six affirmative votes to bind the corporation.
This is so because a quorum would still be present. The result differs from the preceding example because the departed shares are
no longer "represented." The question remains whether shareholders who withdraw are to be treated for quorum purposes in the
manner of abstentions or departures.
As noted earlier, subsection (3) of section 607.094 is intended
to preserve the quorum. Although still present for quorum purposes, the critical question is whether the withdrawn shares are
still "represented" for voting purposes under subsection (2). An
anomaly would exist if withdrawals were treated as abstentions,
because those who withdrew would enjoy the power to impede the
business of the meeting not possessed by those who merely departed. Therefore, if forty-nine of the original one hundred shares
withdrew and were no longer "represented," then only twenty-six
votes should be necessary to approve the ensuing business of the
meeting. Similarly, if sixty shareholders withdrew, preserving the
quorum at fifty-one for voting purposes under subsection (2)
would effectuate the purpose of the statute because the continued
validity of the meeting would frustrate the objective of the with40. 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 2020, at 102.
41. This example illustrates the distinction between the quorum requirement of subsection (1) and the majority of represented shares requirement of subsection (2). The shareholders must meet the requirements of subsection (1) before the meeting may be lawfully
conducted. The requirements of subsection (2) assume that a quorum is present and provide

the standard against which the validity of action taken at the meeting is measured: a majority vote of those represented. For example, assume a corporation with 300 shares entitled to

vote at meetings had exercised its option to reduce its quorum requirement to the statutory
minimum of 100 (i.e., 1/3of all shares entitled to vote at the shareholders meeting). FLA.
STAT. § 607.094(1) (1981). At a shareholders' meeting, 200 shares are represented in person

or by proxy. If 100 shares vote in favor of a measure, it will not pass, because 101 votes are
needed to constitute a majority of those represented. This result occurs because, although

the 100 voting shares satisfy the minimum quorum, the quorum requirement is irrelevant
beyond the threshold question of the meeting's validity.
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drawing shareholders. Under the latter hypothetical, as long as
twenty-six shareholders are prepared to approve matters brought
to a vote, the meeting can continue. 42 Thus, the statute envisions
the creation of an artificial quorum designed to permit the meeting
to continue transacting business. This result conforms with that
advanced by the ABF-ABA commentators. 8
In sum, section 607.094(3) of the Florida Statutes should be
construed to distinguish between shareholder departures and withdrawals. Corporate officials and counsel should note that the statute confers the power on abstainers to control the conduct of meetings. As a result, dissident shareholders may still effectively
influence a meeting by attending and refusing to vote. But, if dissident shareholders withdraw, the quorum will be preserved for voting purposes, albeit at the minimum level prescribed by statute or
the bylaws. As long as a majority of the remaining represented
shares is prepared to approve matters brought to a vote, and that
majority also constitutes a majority of the minimum legal quorum,
any action taken at the meeting will be valid. Finally, the withdrawn shares will be counted as part of the quorum if the meeting
adjourns and then subsequently reconvenes.
For the purposes of clarity, however, Florida should consider
replacing section 607.094(3) of the Florida Statutes with a provision similar to section 602(b) of the California Corporation Code,
which provides:
The shareholders present at a duly called or held meeting at
which a quorum is present may continue to transact business
until adjournment notwithstanding the withdrawal of enough
shareholders to leave less than a quorum, if any action taken
(other than adjournment) is approved by at least a majority of
the shares required to constitute a quorum.
This statute more nearly approximates the ABF-ABA interpretation. The shareholders' meeting may continue after a withdrawal despite the loss of a quorum. Significantly, the California
statute also specifies the number of votes required to validate
shareholder action. The anomaly caused by the omission of the
votes cast requirement in the M.B.C.A. as adopted in Florida and
42. Thus, once established, the quorum is deemed to "legally" continue throughout the

duration of the meeting. The subsequent withdrawal of shares will not vitiate it. FLA.
§ 607.094(3) (1981).

43. See supra text accompanying note 15.
44. CAL. CORP. CODE § 602(b) (West Supp. 1981).
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other states that confers the additional power on abstainers, however, remains.
DANIEL E. SOMERS

